Using data drawn from a nationwide voter-tendencies survey conducted shortly before the July 2007 parliamentary election in Turkey, inter-party vote movements during the 2002-2007 period are investigated with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as the focal point. A descriptive analysis relying on two and four-way partitions of the dataset reveals that, in comparison to the relatively small group of 'deserters' from the party, the 'newcomers' to the AKP are younger, mostly female, more satisfied with the performance of the economy, and more likely to be pro-EU membership. The data also shows that AKP supporters are less educated and less concerned with the threats to secularism than the rest of the voters. The key finding of the econometric work is that economic evaluationsespecially retrospective ones-have a strong association with the party choice in the 2007 elections. 
Introduction
In the July 22, 2007 Turkish parliamentary election, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) increased its vote share to 46.6 percent from 34.3 percent in the previous parliamentary election held on November 3, 2002. In doing so, it became the first party since 1954 to raise its vote share after ruling a full legislative term. The party's vote share was also the highest a party with Islamist roots has ever captured in Turkey, and the highest any party has achieved since 1965. The party's success was widespread. It increased its vote share in all of the 81 provinces. What made this success even more remarkable was the fact that it came after the vote shares of many other parties seemed to have hit rock bottom in 2002. In that year, the aggregate vote share of the three incumbent parties-the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP)-had dropped to 14.7 percent from 53.4 percent in 1999. In addition, the dissolution of the main opposition Virtue Party (FP) by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 2001 forced 15.4 percent of the electorate, which voted for this party in 1999, to make another choice in 2002. The AKP, which emerged from the banned FP, only 15 months before the election, had captured the lion's share of the votes lost by the parties mentioned.
Based on past experience of Turkish politics, it would have made more sense to anticipate that, in 2007, at least some of these votes would return to the parties from which they originated, but in fact what occurred was the exact opposite. Although MHP, one of the former incumbent parties, was able to raise its vote share from 8. who entered the 2007 election as independents to avoid the nationwide ten-percent threshold for representation in the parliament, received 3.8 percent of the vote whereas the vote share of the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), the predecessor of DTP, was 6.2 percent in 2002. The vote share of the Felicity Party (SP), the other party to emerge from the ashes of the banned FP, but which towed its anti-Western, anti-EU and pro-Islamist line instead of disavowing them like AKP, virtually remained constant at about 2.5 percent. The aggregate vote shares of the remaining parties decreased to 2.2 from 5.1 percent.
In short, between 2002 and 2007, the AKP captured 12.3 of the 18.6 percentage points shed by the other parties. It is not clear however, exactly which of the other parties' supporters and which specific socio-economic and ideological segments of them, the AKP appealed to in particular. There are very few quantitative studies focusing on this aspect of the 2007 election outcomes. Some of these are limited to a descriptive examination of survey results (Konda, 2007a) . Others make use of province level election results to uncover the association between parties' vote shares in 2002 and 2007 using correlation analysis (Tosun, 2007) or geographical patterns (Veri, 2007) 1 .
In the present study, we intend to determine the sources of the AKP votes in 2007 using micro data which will enable us to consider voter characteristics in detail. For this purpose, 1 The remaining quantitative studies dealing with the 2007 election investigate mostly the role played by political inertia, economic considerations, and socio-economic, demographic and ideological characteristics of the voters, in general, in casting their ballots for the AKP in 2007. Çarkoğlu (2008) and Kalaycıoğlu (2008) do this by applying regression analysis to the 2007 Turkish Election Survey, whereas Genar (2007) , Konda (2007b), and Esmer (2007) rely on descriptive statistics.
we will utilize data drawn from a survey conducted by research company KONDA three weeks prior to the 22 July election. Our aim is to identify not only the parties from which the AKP voters have originated, but also the segments of those parties' voter bases the AKP was able to attract in particular.
In the next section, we present descriptive statistics pertaining to our data and discuss the insights they provide. In Section 3, we present the results of the logit regressions which express a voter's tendency to vote for AKP in 2007 as a function of his/her party preference in 2002, socio-demographic and ideological characteristics, and views on the previous and expected performance of the economy. Finally, to determine which segments of the voter bases of other parties the AKP has attracted, we estimate a more comprehensive model in which the interactions between the voter's 2002 party choice and his/her other characteristics are included as explanatory variables. Since this methodology was also adopted by Başlevent and Akarca (2009) to examine the vote movements between 1999 and 2002, the present study should be viewed as an attempt to provide an updated account on the same issue.
The Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data on which we base our study is drawn from a survey conducted by research company KONDA under the direction of Tarhan Erdem three weeks prior to the 22 July election. Although there is virtually no difference in the 2002 and 2007 sample vote shares of the AKP, this does not turn out to be as crippling for our vote movements analysis as it first appears. An inspection of the patterns in Table 1 The sample means of various explanatory variables to be considered in the econometric work are given in Table 2 , with variable definitions provided in the notes to that table. To gain some insights about the differences between those who voted for the AKP in 2007 and those who did not, and between those who are the party's "continuing supporters," "newcomers," "deserters," and "non-supporters," the variable means are also given separately for various subsamples. We should note that the "newcomers" and the "deserters", the two groups of greatest interest with regard to vote movements, together make up 17.5 percent of the working sample, a sizable proportion on which reliable conclusions can be based.
According to the figures in Table 2 , those who voted for AKP are mostly female, younger, less educated, and poorer than the rest of the sample. They do not perceive the threat to secularism as seriously as others, and they are more likely to be pro-EU. They also believe that the economy thrived under the AKP administration both for their families and for the nation, and that it will continue to do so.
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With respect to the four-way partition of the sample, compared to those who have been supporting the party since 2002, the newcomers in 2007 appear to be mostly female, younger, more educated, richer, slightly less optimistic about the economy and about as enthusiastic about EU membership and as unconcerned about acts against secularism. Deserters, on the other hand, are mostly male, older, poorer, less pro-EU, and less optimistic about the state of the economy than the newcomers and continuing supporters. The deserters are also more educated than the continuing supporters, but less educated than the newcomers. However, the three groups seem to be equally unconcerned about the threats to the secular nature of the state. On the whole, economic evaluations and views about EU membership appear to be the most important factors in distinguishing those who did and did not support the AKP in 2002 and/or 2007.
Regression Results
Although the findings presented in the previous section give a pretty good idea about the distinguishing features of AKP supporters (new and continuing), and non-supporters (new and continuing), one needs to establish the statistical significance of these and measure their influence on the likelihood of a voter casting his/her ballot for the AKP in a framework where all other factors are controlled for. In addition, it would also be useful to determine which parties' former voters were more likely to switch to the AKP and which segments of those parties' voter bases the AKP has appealed to in particular. Our aim in this section is to accomplish these tasks.
Our methodology involves explaining the tendency of a voter to vote for the AKP in 2007 using his/her party choice in the 2002 election, his/her demographic and socio-economic characteristics, ideological leanings, and evaluation of the economy. To do this, we fitted logit regressions to the survey data described in the previous section. To determine which segments of other parties the AKP has attracted, we have also considered, as explanatory variables, the interactions between the political party choices in 2002 and the remaining variables. In fitting our equations, we have employed an estimation option available in the software package STATA to compute robust standard errors, treating the data as a collection of clusters. Observations within the clusters -which, in our case are the provinces -are allowed to be dependent while observations from different clusters are assumed to be independent. For more detail on this procedure, the reader can refer to Rogers (1993) .
Findings from the Basic Models
In order to gauge the relative explanatory powers of the variables representing the 2002 party choices of voters and their various characteristics, we estimated two preliminary regressions (presented in the first two columns of Table 3 ). In the first regression, the tendency of a voter to cast his/her ballot for the AKP in The second regression links the probability of a voter voting for the AKP in 2007 to his/her gender, age, years of schooling, income, views on the economy and EU membership. All of these factors, except gender and the stand with regard to EU membership, appear to provide significant information about the voter's embrace or rejection of the AKP. Being younger, less educated, poorer, more optimistic about the economy, and less worried about threats to secularism, raises the chances of support for the party. With pseudo R-square values of 0.39 and 0.41, respectively, both equations seem to have a reasonable degree of explanatory power. The logical next step is to consider a specification which combines the two sets of variables.
In the third regression given in Table 3 , the likelihood of voting for the AKP in 2007 is expressed as a function of all the variables used in the first two regressions. This increases the pseudo R-square substantially, to 0.59, and renders the estimated coefficient of age variable insignificant, in addition to the gender variable. However, the estimated coefficient of the pro-EU dummy variable becomes significant. The variable related to the 2002 vote for the GP also becomes insignificant but that of the SP turns significant. The addition of the variables in the second regression to the first causes the negative coefficient estimates for ANAP, DYP, DEHAP, and MHP to increase in absolute value, but those of CHP, DSP, and GP to decrease. The near zero coefficient of SP becomes a larger negative one. This suggests that the socio-economic and ideological characteristics of 2002 voters of different parties have different impacts on the likelihood of voting for the AKP in 2007.
Even though the relative importance of the variables in Table 3 can be assessed through the relative magnitudes of their estimated coefficients, the computation of marginal effects facilitates the interpretation of the models' findings. When interaction terms and multicategorical variables are absent, these figures are quite easy to obtain through the use of the statistical package. The marginal effects given in the last column of Table 3 are based on the all-inclusive model and refer to the changes in an 'average' voter's probability to vote for AKP, resulting from marginal changes in the explanatory variables in question. More specifically, the marginal effect of an explanatory variable is the change in the probability of voting for the AKP, in response to a one unit increase in the variable, holding the remaining variables constant at their sample means. In the case of binary variables, the marginal effect is defined as the change in the same probability in response to a discrete change of the variable from 0 to 1, again evaluating the remaining variables at their means. In the case of party dummies, we must also take into account that when one of them takes on the value of 1, the others need to equal zero. Therefore, their marginal effects were calculated holding the rest of the party dummies constant at zero.
The magnitudes of the marginal effects are more or less proportionate to the corresponding coefficient estimates, and they also have marginal significance levels (i.e. p-values) which are quite similar to those of the coefficients. In the case of party dummies, our model's coefficient estimates translate into sizeable marginal effects. The marginal effect for the CHP dummy implies that the probability of voting for the AKP is 39 percentage points lower for someone who voted for CHP in the previous election compared to someone who did not vote for any of the listed parties. The marginal effects for the remaining opposition parties are also statistically significant, albeit smaller in magnitude. On the other hand, having voted for the AKP in the previous election increases the probability of voting for that party again in 2007 by 36 percentage points. As for the remaining variables, we find that the composite economy variable has the largest effect on the probability of voting for the AKP. A one point increase in the variable corresponds to a probability increase of 33 percentage points. Considering that the average values of this variable differ by 1.7 points between those who did and did not vote for the AKP, we conclude that the economic factor accounts for a substantial portion of the voting decision. The only other variable that has a significant positive marginal effect is the Pro-EU dummy. Being in favor of Turkey's EU membership makes a 7 percentage point difference in the probability of voting for the AKP. On the other hand, each additional year of schooling has a 2 percentage point negative effect, and a onepoint move up the income scale has a 5 percentage point negative effect on the same probability. Finally, the secularism dummy has a 7 percentage point negative effect. Even though the gender and age dummies fail to produce statistically significant results, the signs of the marginal effects suggest that the AKP is more popular among women and people younger than 44 years.
Given the key role played by the overall economy variable in the model, a more detailed look into the economic aspect of the voting decision is in order. To gain more insight in this regard, we also experimented with models in which the composite economy variable is replaced with its various subcomponents. 4 In one specification, retrospective and prospective economic evaluations are considered, while in another socio-tropic and pocketbook evaluations are included. Our finding is that retrospective evaluations are much better predictors of the tendency to vote for the AKP than prospective ones. While the marginal effect of the former is +28 percent, the latter's impact is only +4 percent. The socio-tropic and pocketbook evaluations yield estimated marginal effects closer in value: +23 and +11 percent, respectively.
We also estimated a model which included all four variants of economic voting: the retrospective pocketbook, prospective pocketbook, retrospective socio-tropic and prospective socio-tropic. Despite the high degree of correlation between and the relatively small variation within them (which are reasons why we have chosen not to focus on this specification), the estimated coefficients of these variables turned out to be statistically significant, with the exception of prospective pocketbook evaluations. While the marginal effects of both retrospective (socio-tropic and pocketbook) variables were estimated to be around 27 percent those of the prospective socio-tropic variable had a marginal effect of only 13 percent.
Findings from the Model with Interaction Terms
In the final step of our empirical work, we estimated a more comprehensive model which allows the impact of an explanatory variable to vary by the party voted for in 2002. This model includes party dummies and their interactions with the remaining variables, and can be looked upon as an 'unrestricted' version of the earlier specification where each socioeconomic, demographic and ideological variable is replaced by 10 interaction terms. Along with the nine parties, the rest of the sample is treated as a separate affiliation which in turn implies that instead of a single slope parameter 10 different slopes are estimated. Depending on which interaction terms are statistically significant, the model's estimates reveal which segments of the parties' voter bases were attracted to the AKP in particular. Note that the interaction terms involving the secularism dummy are excluded from the model due to two reasons. First, for three out of the 10 groups, namely among the former CHP, DEHAP, and GP voters, there are no respondents in the sample for whom SECULARISM=1 and AKP07=1, implying that the related terms would have to be dropped from the model. Secondly, the interaction terms for the remaining groups turned out to be statistically insignificant.
The estimates from the unrestricted model, reported in Table 4 reveal that economic evaluations are the best predictors of voters' tendency to vote for the AKP. All of the interaction terms involving the Economy variable are positive and significant, except for one (which appears to be due to the small number of observations), implying that good economic performance under the party's rule and its promise of a strong economy provides a near universal appeal for the AKP. Interestingly, the largest coefficient is on the term involving the CHP dummy. Since no other interaction term involving this party is significant, we can conclude that the AKP was able to attract voters from its biggest rival only for economic reasons.
5 Education turns out to be an important factor as well, with six out of 10 interaction terms being statistically significant. The negative signs of the coefficients of these variables imply that the AKP appealed particularly to the less educated voters of most parties, including its own. 5 When the economy variable is split into its retrospective and prospective components, we find that nine out of 10 interaction terms involving the retrospective variable are positive and statistically significant (only the coefficient of interaction term involving DEHAP is insignificant) whereas the corresponding number for the prospective variable is only two out of ten (the coefficient of interaction term involving SP is negative and 'rest of sample' is positive). When the socio-tropic and pocketbook components are introduced, we find that eight out of 10 interaction terms involving the socio-tropic variable are statistically significant (the coefficients of interaction terms involving ANAP and DYP are insignificant) as opposed to five for the pocketbook variable (the coefficients of interaction terms involving ANAP, CHP, DSP, GP, and SP are insignificant).
Most of the remaining variables in the model are statistically insignificant, but the few significant ones provide good clues as to what type of voters were most likely to have voted for the AKP in 2007. Gender and a pro-EU stand matter only for those who voted in 2002 for the AKP and SP-the other party with Islamist roots. This finding suggests that the AKP continues to attract voters from the traditional pro-Islamist base by persuading some of the people in that camp to soften their anti-Western views. The income level affects the votes captured by the AKP significantly only from the Kurdish-nationalist DEHAP. In the 2007 election, the AKP performed extremely well in the eastern and south-eastern provinces where DEHAP had received a large proportion of votes in 2002. Our finding shows that the AKP appealed especially to the less-educated and higher-income segment of the latter party's electorate who benefited from the economic progress under the AKP administration and hoped for its continuation.
A comparison of the estimates summarized in Tables 3 and 4 reveals the importance of using interaction terms. For example, relying on the basic model alone, one gets the impression that the income level and EU variables are significant determinants of AKP votes when, in fact, this is the case for an 'average' voter. Only through the model with interaction terms does one observe that income was an important determinant only for those who supported the DEHAP in the previous election, and the stand concerning EU was relevant only for those who supported the AKP or SP in 2002.
Similarly, the basic model suggests that gender and age were unimportant for all voters in making their party choice in 2007, whereas the interaction model reveals that gender was important in the case of voters who preferred the AKP or the SP in 2002, but that age indeed was irrelevant for the entire electorate.
Conclusion
The AKP came to power at the end of 2002, only 15 months after its establishment. During the following four years, the growth rate of the economy averaged 7.5 percent per year, ranging between 5.3 and 9.4 percent. Remarkably, this occurred while the inflation rate (growth rate of GDP deflator) declined from a 37.4 percent per year level to 9.3 percent. Capitalizing on such a good economic performance, the party used the phrase "what we accomplished so far is the guarantee of what we will accomplish in the future" as its campaign slogan in the 2007 election. The main campaign theme of its opponents, on the other hand, was that the secular regime would be in severe jeopardy in case of another AKP term. Our findings suggest that in the 2007 election, most voters cast their ballots with the economy on their minds, and they greatly outnumbered those who voted with the intention of protecting the secular regime. This should not come as a surprise as economic voting was found to be a crucial factor in other Turkish elections as well (For evidence from time-series and cross-section data, see for example Akarca and Tansel, 2006 , Akarca, 2009 , and Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu and Şenatalar, 2009 . Given the dominance of economic evaluations over the remaining factors in explaining the party choice of Turkish voters, our findings can be interpreted as evidence in favor of the 'rational voter hypothesis' which argues that citizens will vote for the candidate who is expected to yield the greatest amount of future expected utility.
Estimates from a comprehensive econometric model revealed that, besides those voting economically, the less educated voters of most parties, pro-EU supporters and males of the pro-Islamist SP, and the relatively rich of the pro-Kurdish DEHAP, provided the AKP with yet other sources of new supporters. Of its 2002 supporters, the party was able to especially retain the females, the less-educated, those who are pro-EU, and those who benefited and hope to continue benefiting from the strong economy. The examined descriptive statistics suggested that the newcomers to the party had the same traits, perhaps with the exception of being slightly better-educated. What distinguished the deserters from the two mentioned groups is that they were mostly male, older, of lower income, had less support for the EU, and did not benefit from the economic boom during AKP's first term in office. In short, it was essentially the economy that determined who stayed with the party, who deserted it, who decided to join it anew, and who continued to stay away from it.
Besides the economic factors, there were many other important factors that were likely to have contributed to the overwhelming support for the AKP. For instance, the party's move to the center over time and its disavowal of its Islamist roots have no doubt dissipated the worries of some voters that the party may adopt an anti-secular stance, thus allowing the party to broaden its support base. Also, the perception of the international community that the ruling party had performed well on many tough issues including EU accession negotiations and the handling of the Iraq war and the issue of Cyprus might have induced a domestic perception of satisfaction with the ruling party independent of party identification and political color.
The outcome of the March 2009 local elections suggests that the economy played an important role in that election as well. However, for the first time, the impact was against the AKP, as the Turkish economy has already begun to feel the effects of the severest global economic crisis since the Great Depression. Analysis of micro data from that election in future work is likely to provide valuable insights as to how the economy ranked among the factors that led to the decline in the vote share of the AKP in 2009. Notes: GENDER equals one in the case of a female respondent, and zero in the case of a male respondent. AGE44+ equals one in the case of a respondent who is 44 years of age or older, and zero otherwise. SCHOOLING is constructed from the information about the highest level of schooling completed such that it takes on the value of zero for illiterates, 2 for literates with no diploma, 5, 8, 11, and 15 for elementary school, middle school, high school and university graduates, respectively. It is equal to 18 if the respondent has a Master's Degree or a Ph.D. INCOME takes on values between one and five, depending on the quantile in which the respondent places himself/herself in the income distribution, with 5 representing the highest income group. PRO-EU equals one if the respondent believes that Turkey must join the EU, and zero otherwise. SECULARISM equals one if the respondent picks "Acts against secularism" in response to the survey question "In your opinion, which TWO of the following are the most urgent problems of Turkey?" where "Poverty", "Corruption", "Acts against democracy", "Insufficiency of social security system", "No Opinion", and "No Answer" are the remaining choices. Each of the variables relating to voters' evaluation of the economy takes on values between 1 and 5. These are constructed from responses to the following four survey questions: 1. Did the economic conditions worsen, remain the same or improve, during the past five years, for your family? 2. Did the economic conditions worsen, remain the same or improve, during the past five years, for the nation as a whole? 3. Do you expect the economic conditions to worsen, remain the same, or improve during the next five years, for your family? 4. Do you expect the economic conditions to worsen, remain the same, or improve during the next five years, for the nation as a whole? The three possible responses to each of these questions are assigned 1, 3 and 5 points, respectively. If the points obtained from the above questions are labeled as Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4, respectively, the composite economy variable and its subcomponents are defined as follows: Retrospective = (Q1 + Q2) ÷ 2, Prospective = (Q3 + Q4) ÷ 2, Socio-tropic = (Q2 + Q4) ÷ 2, Pocketbook = (Q1 + Q3) ÷ 2 and finally, ECONOMY = (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4) ÷ 4. Thus the values of these variables also range from 1 to 5. Table 2 . The numbers given in parentheses, below the coefficient estimates, are the probability values. The marginal effect of an explanatory variable is the change in Prob (AKP07=1) (which has an initial value of 0.357 when computed at the means of the variables) in response to a one unit increase of the explanatory variable, holding the remaining variables constant at their sample means. In the case of binary variables, the marginal effect is the change in Prob (AKP07=1) in response to a discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1. In the case of the party dummies, the marginal effect is the change in Prob (AKP07=1) (from an initial value of 0.422 at the specified values of the variables) in response to a change in the relevant dummy from 0 to 1, holding the other party dummies at zero and the rest of the variables at their sample means. Tables 2 and 3. 
